The decision-making process for military operations in the ground forces of the armed forces of the NATO countries
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.34169/2414-0651.2018.4(20).3-8Keywords:
decision-making process, courses of action, military command procedure, military decision making processAbstract
The article presents the procedure for making military decisions in the Ground forces of the Armed forces of NATO countries according to their standards. The purpose of the article is to improve the process of making military decisions in the Armed Forces of Ukraine through the use of the order of making military decisions in the armed forces of the NATO countries with their standards. The process of making military decisions is a planning methodology that integrates the activities of the commander, the headquarters in order to understand the situation and combat task, the development and comparison of hostilities, the choice of a courses of action, and the development of an operational plan or order to perform combat task. For a detailed analysis of combat variants, a military game is considered, during which the visualization of the course of operations is taken into account, taking into account the strengths of its troops and their location, the enemy’s capabilities and possible variants of combat operations, the impact and needs of the civilian population in the area of the operation, as well as other aspects of the situation. The result of the war game is a refined version of the fighting, a matrix of synchronization completed, as well as a decision support template and a decision support matrix for each version of the fighting. The general method that helps the commander to make the best decision is the matrix of decisions, which is the tool for a careful and logical comparison and evaluation of the courses of action. The synchronization table shows how their troops for a specific action are synchronized in time, space and purpose in relation to the variant of enemy combat operations or other events. To determine the effectiveness and effectiveness of options for the resolution of hostilities in their comparison, the criteria for their evaluation have been determined. The most complex form of conducting a military game is a modern simulation model for the control of troops and weapons is required. Regardless of the form of conduct, each critical event within the framework of the courses of action must be played out through the actions of its troops and counter forces to the enemy.
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