Protection of automated workstations against information leakage through compromising electromagnetic emissions and conducted signals: contradictions and modern approaches

Authors
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.34169/2414-0651.2025.4(48).81-89
Keywords:
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Abstract

The article addresses the challenges of protecting automated workstations (AWS) against information leakage through compromising electromagnetic emissions (CEME). A comparative review of key international standards in this field (United States, Germany, russia, China) is presented. Particular attention is paid to a fundamental contradiction: despite significant state expenditures on the protection of AWS from information leakage via CEME channels, there is no publicly available data on modern technical intelligence systems exploiting CEME channels, nor confirmed experiments on intercepting information through this channel at distances greater than ten meters. The physical principles of electromagnetic wave propagation and the factors limiting the interception range of information signals are examined. Current research on near-field CEME registration, patents and the market for secure AWS are analyzed. The necessity of Ukraine’s transition from the paradigm of total protection to a differentiated, risk-oriented approach based on security profiles is substantiated, especially under wartime conditions. Priority directions of work in this area are proposed, which, if successfully implemented, will minimize state expenditures and provide optimal solutions for organizing the protection of AWS.

Author Biography
  1. Oleg Kostyna, Central Scientific Research Institute of Armament and Military Equipment of the Armed Forces of Ukraine

    Candidate of Military Sciences, Associate Professor

References

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Website: https://youtu.be/Z_VmQXZP9Vw?feature=shared.

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Published
2025-12-31
Issue
Vol. 48 No. 4 (2025): Weapons and military equipment
Section
INFORMATION SYSTEMS
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Copyright (c) 2025 Олександр Ковалько,Олег Костина,Людмила Оникієнко,Сергій Ступак

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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

How to Cite

Protection of automated workstations against information leakage through compromising electromagnetic emissions and conducted signals: contradictions and modern approaches. (2025). Weapons and Military Equipment, 48(4), 81-89. https://doi.org/10.34169/2414-0651.2025.4(48).81-89

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